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Utilizing Human Factors to Improve Perioperative Adverse Event Investigations: An
Integrated Approach
Abstract
Objective: Apply Human Factors (HF), systems engineering, and high reliability organizational
principles to improve adverse event investigations in a regional hospital system. Background:
Given the complexity of medicine and healthcare systems, innovative thinking is required to
ensure these systems are resilient to error. Understanding the work system and its constituent
parts is fundamental to understanding how errors begin and propagate. Method: This paper
provides a discussion on employing a systems-based approach to improve perioperative
adverse event investigations within a hospital system. Results: Data was collected across 13
investigations. The findings are summarized into 16 contributing factors, with 10 specific
examples of critical/serious risks that were addressed by the hospital system. Conclusion:
Modern medicine needs to look to HF to improve safety and reduce errors. This manuscript
provides a systems-based approach grounded in HF and organizational theories to improve how
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investigations are conducted and the approach to human error within a large hospital system.
Application: This work provides practical guidance for those who want to improve
postoperative investigations within their own units or hospitals.
Precis: This article describes research that evolves the approach to accident investigation to
improve perioperative adverse event investigations in hospital settings.
Keywords: Accident analysis, anesthesiology/perioperative care, patient safety, communication
and teamwork, care transitions and handoffs, organizational behavior/design

INTRODUCTION
Modern HF work in the medical setting focuses heavily on leveraging a systems-based
approach to understanding and preventing the propagation of errors (Russ et al., 2013). Current
estimates have deaths related to medical error as high as 250,000 per year in the U.S. (Makary
& Daniel, 2016); although, others calculate deaths closer to 50,000 per year (Shojania & DixonWoods, 2017). According to Senders (1994), “human error in medicine, and the adverse events
that may follow, are problems of psychology and engineering, not of medicine.” Despite
increased recognition of the value of the field of HF and, more importantly, systems thinking to
prevent medical error, adoption has been “sluggish” (Gurses, Ozak, & Pronovost, 2012).
A systems-based approach to review cases to comprehend the contributory factors to
adverse events in healthcare is lacking. Currently, patient chart reviews, grand rounds, incident
reporting, and morbidity and mortality conferences all serve as means to investigate medical
errors and safety events. Unfortunately, they often take a narrow approach. For example, task
work (i.e., clinical topics) is typically the primary discussion, thereby, excluding teamwork even
though it is critical to providing safe care (Mitchell et al., 2012). As another example, adverse
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event reviews often target individual contributions as opposed to the understanding how other
factors (e.g., organizational policies, equipment, or environmental layout) may have
contributed to an event. These examples illustrate that while the medical community has
certainly made strides regarding understanding and preventing errors, the mechanisms
surrounding the analysis of adverse events need additional advancement for the discipline to
progress towards providing consistent, quality, and safe care.
Therefore, the purpose of this paper is to examine an integrative approach utilizing a
human factors/systems engineering perspective for investigation surrounding perioperative
death (i.e., a death of a patient within 48 hours of a surgical procedure) in a hospital system:
the Critical Event Response Team (CERT). Having this goal in mind, we will first discuss the
background that served as the foundation to the investigation approach. Next, we detail the
methods of the approach and the results of implementing the approach. We then conclude
with a discussion of the limitations and the implications for theory and practice.
BACKGROUND: TAKING A SYSTEMS PERSPECTIVE
State of the Hospital System Prior to the Critical Event Response Team
A community hospital system using a root cause analysis (RCA) process expressed their
desire for an alternative approach to adverse event investigation with the aim to further
improve patient safety. The main impetus was that the hospital mortality review noticed that
some patients who entered surgery with seemingly benign procedures expired unexpectedly.
The system’s RCA process facilitated some understanding of error in the context of
perioperative deaths; however, the existing approach did not tie outcomes to actions, was
narrow in scope regarding the topics covered, and had no HF expertise involved. The existing
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RCA process also occurred over months rather than days and was generally inflexible. Further,
there tended to be little, if any, direct communication or involvement of physicians to the
outcome of RCA investigations. Mainly physicians gave insight into chart reviews but were left
out of the process aside from this contribution.
Recognizing the limitations of the process that was being employed by the hospital, we
sought to enhance the investigatory process by employing a systems-based approach rooted in
human factors and organizational principles. The principles we leveraged strengthen the entire
process from developing the investigatory team and process to collecting and analyzing the
data as well as disseminating findings and sustaining change. For a list of these principles, refer
to XXXX.
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Figure 1. Review of how each investigative aspect was applied to the investigative process

METHOD
The following sections describe the methods relating to preparation, active case
procedures, and data processing and synthesis. While the CERT method is a multidisciplinary
approach including both medical personnel and Human Factors specialists, the Human Factors
specialists guided the framework and process development and were integral to the
implementation of the methods. Two of the human factors specialists (EHL & JRK) have
extensive experience with both having worked for over 12 years in HF/E applied to medical
systems. The third human factors specialist (EB) had approximately 20 years experience
interviewing domain experts working in both military and commercial aviation complex
systems.
A summary of the approach is delineated in Figure 1.

Interview Protocol
A key component of the CERT approach is a retrospective interview protocol. To ensure
that the interviews targeted all aspects of the system while still being clinically appropriate, the
HF psychologists and medical experts developed a semi-structured, retrospective interview
protocol. The SEIPS 2.0 model (Holden et al., 2013) was a primary driver for the question
generation and organization process. The questions fall into categories: tasks, tools/technology,
individuals and teams, the environment, and the organization. Leveraging the SEIPS 2.0
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organizational schema ensured comprehensive coverage of the entire system surrounding an
adverse event. Further, the clarity that SEIPS 2.0 focus on tasks, individuals, tools, or policy
provides, also facilitates subsequent change (Stanton, 2017). Simply stated, the focus is on
gathering information that will later point to solutions. See Table 1 for example questions.
Table 1.
Example questions from Interview Protocol
Personnel Background:
1. What is your position at the hospital?
2. How long have you worked in the field? At this hospital?
3. What shift were you working during the incident?
For anesthesiologists
1. How many cases were you managing?
2. Were you originally assigned to take care of this patient?
3. Did you have adequate time to prepare?
Task:
Critical Incident
1. In your own words, what happened?
a. Can you give an overview of the incident?
b. (after the interviewee gives an overview, we can begin probing questions below)
Prior to surgery
1. Were there any concerns in the preparation of this patient? (If so, please describe)
2. Was the patient properly prepared to go to surgery?
3. Did you have all the information you needed for this case going in?
During the surgery
1. Where did the situation/case/ process go wrong? In your opinion, when did things start going south? What was
happening?
2. In your opinion, what were the causes of the incident? What steps or events were involved in (contributed to) the
incident?
Provider/Team:
Continuity/Teamwork/Training
1. What was the team size for the task?
a. Was it an appropriately sized team for this task?
b. Who do you view as the leader of the team?
2. What were the tasks, roles, and responsibilities of team members/providers?
a. Were the tasks, roles, and responsibilities of each provider clearly defined?
b. To your knowledge is every team member aware of his or her role in the team?
3. During the surgery, were there any changes in providers?
a. Was there a shift change during surgery?
Workload, Information and Distractions
1. Was all necessary information available, accurate, and complete? Any missing? Incomplete? Please describe.
2. What was the level of workload during this case?
a. Do you think workload was a factor in this case?
b. If so, what was the main source of high workload during this case?
3. Were distractions or interruptions a factor in this case?
a. Describe these distractions/interruptions.
Material/Equipment/Physical Environment:
1. How was the patient identified?
2. Was there any specific equipment that you think was involved in the incident? Describe.
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3. Was everything that you needed (equipment and tools) available in a timely fashion? (E.g., blood products, rapid
transfusion equipment, surgical devices, additional personnel, and etc.).
Organization/Process:
1. Describe the culture of the hospital.
2. How was the continuity of care?
3. Describe the handoff process used when giving and receiving a handoff.

Preparing the Critical Event Review Team (CERT)
Next, the Human Factors specialists developed and implemented two 4-hour training
sessions for the medical personnel on the CERT. The purpose of this training was to familiarize
the medical domain experts with the approach, rationale, and the cognitive interviewing
procedures. Two training sessions occurred. The first training session described and discussed
basic principles of Human Factors, systems engineering, and healthcare Human Factors
research in general. Once the medical personnel were familiar with these concepts, the Human
Factors specialists conducted a second training session to explain effective interviewing
techniques and demonstrated the interview procedure.
Establishing a Trigger for Investigations
The primary trigger for the investigation team was a perioperative death; the trigger
was any patient death within 48 hours of a surgical incision. Two exclusion criteria were used,
based on following: 1) the patient’s preoperative rating/health score according to the American
Society of Anesthesiologists (ASA) physical classification system (also known as the “ASA score”)
and 2) the patient’s Preoperative Score to Predict Postoperative Mortality (POSPOM) score (Le
Manach, 2016). The ASA score is a global assessment conducted by the attending
anesthesiologist that relies on both objective values (e.g., laboratory tests) and subjective data
(e.g. patient interviews). This data is utilized to categorize the overall health of a surgical
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patient into one of six categories for living patients. The range is from “1” (normal healthy
patient) to “6” (brain-dead patient). Although use of the ASA physical class assignments/scores
is ubiquitous, the rating systems suffers from a lack of scientific reliability (Owens, 1978). In
contrast, POSPOM, a highly sensitive and specific risk calculator, is based on validated 17
variables out of three domains: Age, co-morbidities and surgery type (Le Manach, 2016).
Generally, the reviews focused on individuals who had low ASA (<4) and POSPOM scores (<20%
risk of mortality from surgery) that were considered to be at minimal risk for perioperative
death by the domain experts.
Investigation Method
The CERT team aimed to conduct the investigations within 72 hours of the event to
reduce interviewee memory decay from impacting the results. Furthermore, each investigation
used three channels of information: 1) organization internal reports related to the case (e.g.,
electronic medical record, shift reports, risk department report), 2) physical walkthrough
inspection and examination of technology/devices where the incident occurred, and 3)
interviews with providers and other staff surrounding the perioperative event procedure.
When a perioperative death occurred within 48 hours of surgery, two CERT medical
domain experts (e.g., surgeon, anesthesiologist) were alerted. These two individuals reviewed
the internal reports, the patient’s ASA and POSPIM scores, and made the determination if the
case was appropriate for the CERT team to investigate. The reviews focused on individuals who
had low ASA and POSPOM scores that were at minimal risk for perioperative death by the
domain experts. Once the case was approved for CERT investigation, the CERT team members
were notified, and within 24 hours, the team members discussed the case via conference call to
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select interview participants. While the medical personnel discussed clinical diagnostics, the HF
specialists maintained the systems perspective. Maintaining a systems perspective helped to
ensure that a broad range of providers and personnel were considered for selection in in the
subsequent interview process. After identifying the desired interviewees, CERT team members
of the same expertise reached out to the respective individuals, explained CERT, and invited
them to be interviewed. For example, if the CERT team desired to interview an anesthesiology
who had worked on a case, then an anesthesiologist on the CERT team would contact that
individual. The purpose of the expert-to-expert conversations and interview invitations was to
increase trust, buy-in and participation in the interview process.
When the Human Factors scientists arrived on-site for the interviews, they participated
in a walkthrough of the area(s) in which the case occurred. The purpose of the walkthrough
was to provide the HF specialist and other team members the opportunity for a visual
inspection of the physical layout. Having a conceptualization of the physical layout was
important for the CERT team to understand subsequent interviewee responses related to
descriptions of the physical space and to consider layout related factors. Since the Human
Factors specialists were not familiar with the locations, they could provide unbiased views of
the surroundings.
Interview Procedure
After the initial review of the related internal reports and the walkthroughs, the team
conducted the retrospective, semi-structured interviews. A HF scientist led the interview
process and was present for all interviews for that case. The purpose of having the HF specialist
lead the interviews was to maintain a systems perspective, to establish a non-threatening
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environment to help interviewees feel comfortable, and to ensure a valid and reliable datacollection process that comes with an experienced interviewer. Additionally, the HF scientist
was joined by at least one provider with relevant domain expertise for the respective
interviewee (e.g., an anesthesiologist was on the interview team when an anesthesiologist was
being interviewed; a surgeon was on the interview team when a surgeon was interviewed). The
domain expert would ask additional questions and clarify jargon and relevant terms as needed.
Lastly, individuals from the hospital’s risk management department, including a scribe, joined
the interviews and provided background information about the timeline and patient history. At
the beginning of each interview, the interviewee was briefed on the procedure and purpose of
the interview and asked if they were willing to be audio recorded.
Post-processing and final report creation
Following the interviews for each respective case, the scribe transcribed the audio
recordings (and/or prepared for review any written/typed interview notes for those individuals
who did not consent to be recorded) and delivered the interview data to the HF scientists. The
content analysis involved reading the transcribed interviews and identifying key themes that
occurred (e.g., more than one interviewee stating that a distraction had occurred). The
scientists performed the work independently to minimize any potential bias based on the
perspectives of the other scientists. After all three HF scientists finished content analyzing the
transcripts, the scientists aggregated the findings into factors contributing to the incident. The
scientists resolved any disagreements through consensus meetings. The HF scientists then
synthesized the findings into a report and submitted the aggregated findings/report to the
team’s domain experts for review. Following, the entire CERT team (HF scientists and domain
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experts) conducted a debrief. During the debrief, the HF scientist led in-depth discussions
about the factors that the report highlighted. During this debrief, the CERT team would rank
issues uncovered during the case into one of four categories based on how widespread the
issue is and how much risk it introduced into the system (Table 2). Classifying issues into these
severity ratings provides guidance to the organization on which areas to apply resources and a
reasonable timeline for completion. This research complied with the American Psychological
Association’s Code of Ethics and was approved by the hospital systems Chief Quality and Safety
Officer and offices of Risk Management and Patient Safety. As such, this study qualified as
Quality Improvement and did not necessitate an approval from the Institutional Review Board.
Overall, the entire process takes approximately 20 hours of time in total for the HF
researchers, approximately 15-30 hours for the transcriptionists, and approximately 1-8 hours
for each provider depending on the number of individuals in their profession that were involved
in the interviews.

Table 2.
Risk level and description adapted from the RCA2 process
Risk Level

Description

Critical Systemic

Issue is widespread and could lead to immediate adverse
events
Issue is widespread and could lead to adverse events if not
resolved soon
Issue is widespread, risk is uncertain, issue should be
investigated
Potential issue that was unrelated to investigated event but
that could lead to adverse events in other circumstances

Serious Systemic
Systemic Risk
Unrelated systemic

RESULTS
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The team reviewed 13 cases between 2016 - c2020. One case was removed from the
results due to issues surrounding recruitment of relevant interviewees involved in the case.
The team conducted 89 interviews across the 12 retained cases. Among the 89 interviews,
interviewees included a variety of provider types (e.g., medical doctors, nurses, and
technicians). Although the majority of our sample was registered nurses and anesthesiologists
(48% and 15%), we interviewed other professional roles and specialties as well. See Table 3 for
the type and frequency of providers interviewed. Individuals had a wide range of experience
ranging from less than a year to over 45 years working in their respective field.
Table 3.
Types of providers and average years of experience
Provider Type

Number of providers interviewed

Average Years of Experience (Range)

Anesthesiologist

14

17.5 (.5 – 32)

Anesthesia Technologist

1

8(NA)

Certified Registered

9

3.1 (1 – 7)

Surgeon

6

13.7 (3 – 20)

Surgical Technician

3

7.2 (5.5 – 9)

Surgical Resident

1

1.2 (NA)

Registered Nurse

43

14.8 (1 – 45)

Intensivist

2

17 (4 – 30)

Hospitalist

2

11.25 (2.5 – 20)

Cardiologist

2

8.5 (7 – 10)

Nephrologist

1

6 (NA)

Medical Oncologist

1

10(NA)

Critical Care Physician

1

1(NA)

Nurse Anesthetist

15
Gastroenterologist

3

12.2 (5.5 – 20)

Across the 12 investigations, 87 contributing issues were discovered. Using content
analysis, the HF specialists organized these 87 issues into thematic areas which resulted in 16
categories. These categories are listed in Table 4 with their respective frequency of instances
that issue appeared during the 12 reviews. Of the factors that appeared in our reviews, the
three most prevalent were machine/equipment issues (13 instances), patient health (12
instances), and teamwork (11 instances). All cases included multiple categories.
Table 4.
Contributing factor categories and frequency
Category Name

Description

Frequency

Machine/Equipment Issues

Issue with poorly designed or difficult to use machinery
or equipment

13

Patient Health

Issues surrounding aspects of the patient’s
diagnosis/comorbidities

12

Teamwork

Issues with shared knowledge, skills, and attitudes
amongst the perioperative team

11

Information Loss

Issues surrounding information flow or disruptions

8

Code Response

Issues with activities surrounding code blue events

6

Error Prone Processes

Issues surrounding highly risky or error susceptible
processes

5

Organizational Culture

Issues related to organizational policy or standards

5

Scheduling/Staffing

Issues surrounding schedules, time of day, or
understaffing

5

Workload/Fatigue

Issues with provider’s being tired, overworked, or
fatigued

4

Alerts/Alarms/Distractions

Issues related to extraneous alerts, noises, or other
distractions in the environment

3

Bias

Issues related to bias in provider decision making

3
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Care Continuity

Issues in the care transitions and patient movement

3

Multi-Team System

Issues with coupling between different units, floors, or
hospital systems
Issues related to under-trained staff

3

Drugs

Issues due to effects of drugs or medications used in
the perioperative setting

2

Results/Tests

Issues surrounding results/tests of the patient

1

Training Issues

3

Major findings and interventions from reviews
Across the twelve reviewed cases, we categorized 77 issues as systematic risk or
unrelated systematic risk and ten issues as critical systemic or serious systemic. Due to the
criticality and urgency inherent within the critical systemic and serious systemic ratings, these
ten issues led to interventions. Refer to the previously mentioned Table 3 for definitions of the
risk level ratings. These included a variety of issues with the most common issue surrounding
machine/equipment and code blue responses. A list of the specific issue, the thematic factor
and the subsequent recommendation or organizational actions after they were uncovered are
presented in Table 5.

Table 5.
Critical/Serious Systemic Risks and Recommendations/Actions
Issue

Factor(s)

Recommendation Given or Action Taken

Equipment issue with
SURGINET software

Machine/Equipment Issues

Chief information officer was notified day of interview.
Action plans were escalated and issue was resolved shortly
after.

Lack of information sharing
between separate hospitals

Multi-team system/Care continuity

Began investigation of methods for communicating
between local regional hospitals

Lack of pre-operative care plan

Error prone process

Instituted need for using calculations to better understand
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considering deep vein
thrombosis

deep vein thrombosis risk
Patient Health

Anesthesia involved in development of pre-testing
algorithm including pulmonary hypertension for surgical
patients.

Too many individuals present
during code blue

Code response

Teams should be limited in size of approximately 8
individuals. Individuals on code team should know what
their responsibilities are. Due to bystander effect and social
loafing extraneous individuals should be asked to leave the
room/site of code. Shared with Code Blue committee

Staff unfamiliar with code blue
process

Code Response/Training

Code Blue simulation should be consistently conducted in
hospital, especially for newly on boarded staff. Debriefs
should be conducted after codes. Shared with Code Blue
committee

PYXIS machine failed to
represent patient in its
interface

Machine/Equipment Issues

Medication safety officer was notified and all
machines/processes were put under review.

Sparking defibrillator

Machine/Equipment Issues

Shared with patient safety office

Delay in treatment due to
inability to move patient
through lobby

Care continuity/Organizational
Culture

Chief Nursing Officer was notified to investigate and
resolve

Confusing packaging for
defibrillator pads/sponges

Machine/Equipment Issues

Immediate change in stocking procedure for crash carts

Lack of consideration of
pulmonary hypertension as a
serious perioperative risk

DISCUSSION
Medicine is a complex system comprised of many dynamic, interdependent factors, and
the occurrence of errors and adverse events is inevitable. However, how institutions detect,
examine, and rebound from errors and adverse events can vary. To ameliorate the egregious
consequences of adverse events, a systems-based approach is necessary.
To that end, we employed a unique approach compared to the more traditional patient
chart reviews, morbidity and mortality conferences, and a root cause analysis that are typically
performed when an adverse event arises. Specifically, the investigatory techniques synthesized
the systems engineering in patient safety model (Holden, et al 2013), the root cause analysis

18
and action model (NPSF, 2015), and the principles underpinning high reliability organizational
theory (Sutcliffe, 2011). By leveraging the systems engineering in patient safety model (Holden,
et al, 2013), our investigative tools relied upon queries that targeted the tools and technology,
the person (and teams), the organization, and the environment. By utilizing RCA 2 (NPSF, 2015)
we categorized issues and risk levels to identify problems to determine the appropriate course
of action for remediation. Additionally, we leaned heavily on the idea that any investigation
should be void of blame and punitive actions as that hinders the discussion on errors and halts
the advancement towards a safer system. Finally, our systems-based approach helps the
organization move towards high reliability through pre-occupation with failures and errors,
deferring to experts, having better sensitivity to the front line operations of the organization,
using complex and intensive methods to understand complex problems, and maintaining
resilience through innovative methods and interventions (Weick, Sutcliffe, & Obstfeld, 2008).
The theory driven methodology has several contributions compared to more traditional
error investigative techniques. One contribution was the interdisciplinary nature of CERT that
included both healthcare experts and HF specialists. One example of the importance of the
interdisciplinary nature of CERT is the interview process. For an effective systems approach
interview, it is essential to have interviewees who can speak to all the various facets of the
case. As most researchers experienced in interviewing domain experts can attest, however,
finding and engaging the necessary experts in a timely manner can be an onerous task. This is
where the healthcare expert CERT members come in. That is, integrating aspects of Empower,
Integrate, and Change (shown in Table1), the CERT process had healthcare experts on the CERT
team reach out directly to the desired interviewees to explain the process and invite the
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individuals for interviews. This simple, yet crucial step in the approach resulted in
comprehensive interview participation in most of the cases.
Once the domain experts had secured the interviewees, we utilized HF specialists to
lead the interviews. Just as the domain experts were key to obtain interviewee participation,
the HF specialists were key to an effective data collection process. The benefits are twofold.
First, the HF professionals were not employed within the organization, which empowered
interviewees to be forthcoming since the HF professionals had no authority to influence
interviewee’s job security. Second, HF professionals did not have any established relationships
with the interviewees, limiting the bias associated with familiarity. Additionally, the use of
individual interviews rather than focus groups avoided potential for issues such as groupthink
(i.e., a mode of thinking where unanimity overrides individuality; Whyte, 1989) and power
distance (i.e., the degree of power over subordinates; Lee, Pillutla, & Law, 2000) which can
influence responses.
Another key contribution was the timing of the investigative process. The investigative
process entailed interviews that occurred within 72 hours of the event with the goal to limit
memory decay. RCA2 investigations tend to suffer from time lags. Similarly, morbidity and
mortality conferences are held monthly (e.g., Ksouri et al., 2010). Morbidity and mortality
conferences can still have utility regardless of their frequency; however, limiting them to be
conducted monthly does leave them susceptible to information loss. The emphasis on the
guiding principles of HRO theory made timeliness a major goal of this approach -- a piece that
has thus far appeared absent from other adverse event investigations.
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Moreover, the investigative tool (i.e., semi-structured interview protocol) was also key.
This interview protocol included questions regarding the tools and technology, the person (and
teams), the organization, and the environment. The interview protocol targeted all facets of
the system and ensured that the interview does not overly emphasize one area. To illustrate, an
interviewer that concentrates on the technical expertise of a provider involved in the event
may not uncover any equipment issues, the storage of medications, the process to obtain
necessary equipment, the standardization of the handoff between providers and units, or
distractions occurring in the unit but unrelated to that case, to name a few examples.
Finally, we have created a change column in Figure 1 that describes the impactful effects this
type of process can have on the organization. This included 1) identifying actions and assigning
champions for leading post-review change; 2) leveraging diverse expertise of human factors
specialists; 3) involve hospital leadership in post-review decision making; 4) cultivating a nonpunitive culture that focuses on systemic issues; and 5) focusing on measurement to
understand organizational change longitudinally.
Despite these contributions, this effort had limitations. The first limitation is the small
sample of cases reviewed. The limited cases were due to availability of resources (e.g.,
workload of CERT members) and to the pre-established inclusion criteria. On the flip side, the
pre-determined criteria provided a systematic means to determine the case review as opposed
to simply relying on interest, complexity, or other personal biases. Even though only twelve
cases were reviewed, this included a relatively large sample of providers and, in particular, a
variety of registered nurses. This leads to the second limitation: a low number of surgeons
(~50%) that were willing to be interviewed. Although that number may be low, it was an
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improvement over previous RCA processes in this hospital system. Additionally, many
interviewees participated in each case, which resulted in the rich dataset due to their varied
perspectives. Future work will need to focus on recruitment methods and interview scheduling
strategies to encourage a higher participation rate for the surgeons involved in this type of
review.
CONCLUSION
This paper detailed a process that leverages techniques and knowledge from the field of
HF and Systems Engineering – a process that can guide healthcare organizations to better
understand their own safety needs. This paper includes guidance for healthcare organizations
to identify vulnerabilities within a particular system and areas for remediation. The process is
grounded in the theoretical work of high reliability organizations, systems engineering in
patient safety, and root cause analysis and actions. These theories provided a systemsperspective while minimizing bias and punitive culture. Consequently, organizations can benefit
from providers discussing critical events and adverse events more openly. By providing insights
regarding the critical events surrounding perioperative deaths, healthcare organizations will be
better equipped to be resilient—rather than being debilitated--when critical events and adverse
outcomes occur.
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Key Points:
This manuscript summarizes a novel HF approach for a set of 12 perioperative adverse event
investigations.
Of the cases reviewed, 77 issues emerged. Of these, 10 were considered high enough risk for
the hospital system to devise interventions. Some of these were enacted immediate changes
to the system, while others are ongoing aspects of the systems process improvement efforts.
There is a benefit to using a systems-based approach rooted in HF and organizational
theories when conducting adverse event investigations. These benefits range from a change
in philosophy (e.g. don’t blame the human) to methods and techniques to acquire data that
can uncover issues and lead to positive systems change.
This manuscript provides a set of methods, techniques, and guidance that can be used to
support other similar efforts, within medicine and potentially in other high risk domains.
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